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1 Two vignettes
With the passage of the Old Age Security Act in
1952, Canada replaced a system of means-tested
benefits with a universal Old Age Security (OAS)
pension. Under this programme, described as the
‘cornerstone of Canada’s retirement income system’
(Government of Canada, 2006), every citizen over
the age of 65 receives Can$450 per month.1
However, while Canada is a rich country, even its
government faces competing demands on its
resources. As a result, income received from the
OAS is taxed at a special rate and above a certain
income level, the taxation rate on OAS becomes 100
per cent. Since it makes no sense to pay out a
transfer and then tax it back, individuals above the
certain income level do not actually receive the OAS
but they do report receiving the OAS on their tax
return. They also report having paid tax equivalent to
the OAS amount that was ‘received’. To a casual
observer, this pension is a means-tested income
transfer. The Canadian government, however,
maintains that the OAS is a universal transfer.
In the mid-1990s, the Government of Mexico had a
number of programmes designed to reduce hunger
and poverty among its citizens. These programmes,
some of which had been operating for decades,
included 15 different food subsidy programmes. Four
of these were universal subsidies, including bread and
tortillas in urban areas and maize and maize flour in
rural areas, and these accounted for about two-
thirds of the food subsidy budget (Levy 2006). Most
of the benefits of these universal programmes
accrued to non-poor households. Levy and Rodriguez
(2004) estimate that for every peso spent on the
urban tortilla subsidy, less than 15 per cent actually
reached poor households. The targeting of the bread
programme was even worse. For a number of
reasons, described in Levy (2006), in 1997, these food
subsidies were replaced by a targeted conditional
cash transfer programme called PROGRESA.2
Conservative assessments of the targeting of
PROGRESA indicate that 62.4 per cent of
beneficiary households are in the bottom two
consumption deciles (see Morris et al. 2001 and
Coady 2001).
2 The case for targeting
These vignettes, drawn from very different
programmes being implemented in very different
countries contain the three themes of this article:
that targeting social protection programmes is a
means to an end – where the end is ensuring that
poor households are the ones who benefit from
social protection programmes; that on balance,
existing evidence suggests that targeted
programmes, as currently practised around the
developing world, do indeed deliver a greater share
of programme benefits to poor households; and that
targeted programmes are a mechanism by which the
allocation mechanisms underlying such programmes
can be made more transparent.
To understand the rationale behind targeting,
suppose that our objective is to eliminate
consumption poverty. Using household survey data,
we graph consumption levels of individual
households before any transfers to them (i.e. ‘original
income’), ordering them from worst to best off. This
ordering is represented on the x-axis of Figure 1,
while a household’s income after the transfer is given
on the y-axis, i.e. ‘final income’. The maximum and
minimum household incomes in the survey are Ymax
and Ymin, respectively, and z is the poverty line.
3 The
optimal transfer scheme is one that gives a transfer
to all poor households only (i.e. those with income
less than z), with transfer levels equal to their
individual ‘poverty gaps’, i.e. the distance between
their original income and the poverty line, za. This
transfer programme brings all poor households up to
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the poverty line; all non-poor households have equal
final and original incomes. The poverty budget is thus
represented by the area zaYmin and this is the
minimum budget required to eliminate poverty.
By contrast, consider the case of a universal
programme, which gives the same transfer equal to
t (= c –Ymin) to all households irrespective of poverty
status. Because of the ‘leakage’ of transfers to non-
poor households, the transfers to poor households
are no longer sufficient to eliminate their poverty.
There are two forms of ‘inefficiency’ associated with
the uniform transfer: (1) non-poor households receive
a transfer, and (2) some poor households (those in
the line interval ba) receive transfers greater than
their poverty gaps. These inefficiencies mean that
the poverty impact of the uniform transfer scheme is
less than that of the optimal transfer scheme, less by
the area zcb. Not only does the universal scheme
leak resources to non-poor beneficiaries, it fails to
eliminate poverty.
This argument may sound all very well in theory, but
does it work in practice? Coady et al. (2004a,b)
constructed a database of 122 targeted anti-poverty
interventions in 48 low- or middle-income countries.
A common feature of these programmes is that they
involved a transfer of resources to a beneficiary. As
such, they included cash transfers (including welfare
and social assistance payments, child benefits and
non-contributory pensions), near-cash transfers (such
as quantity-rationed subsidised food rations and food
stamps), food transfers, universal food subsidies, non-
food subsidies, public works and social funds.
In order to compare the targeting of these different
programmes, Coady et al. (2002b) developed a
simple comparative measure: the share of
programme resources transferred to a certain
segment of the population divided by that group’s
share of the total population.4 A universal
programme would have a ratio of one. To see why,
consider the poorest 40 per cent of the population
as ranked by income. Under a universal scheme –
where everyone gets the same – this group receives
40 per cent of programme benefits. If this was
replaced by some form of targeting which produced
a ratio >1, then the targeted programme would be
increasing the share of resources to the poor relative
to the universal programme.
Coady et al. (2002b) constructed this index for 85
programmes. They found that the median
programme had a ratio of 1.25, meaning that it
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Figure 1 Comparing universal and targeted transfers
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transferred 25 per cent more resources to poor
households (defined as households in the bottom
two income or consumption quintiles) than would a
(hypothetical) universal transfer. Median ratios were
highest (1.50) for programmes that used some form
of individual assessment such as means testing, lower
(1.32) for programmes that used some form of
categorical targeting such as targeting based on age
and lowest of all (1.10) for programmes that relied on
self-targeting such as self-targeted food subsidies.
They found that countries with better capacity for
programme implementation do better at directing
benefits towards poorer members of the population,
as do countries where governments are more likely
to be held accountable for their behaviour.
While these examples point to the narrow economic
case for targeting, they do not capture the third
theme implicit within the vignettes. Calling a social
protection programme ‘universal’ does not make it
so nor does it ensure that the programme will
necessarily benefit the poor. In Canada, it is politically
unacceptable to describe the Old Age Security
pension as means-tested even though a means test is
clearly applied. In Mexico, universal subsidies clearly
provided little benefit to the poorest segments of
the population and some, such as the bread subsidy,
provided virtually no benefits.
Lest these examples seem too idiosyncratic, consider
the experiences surrounding the provision of old age
pensions in South Africa and Namibia in the mid-
1990s. In South Africa, the physical delivery of
pensions was undertaken by a government agency.
Mobile automatic teller machines were driven
through the countryside, stopping at meeting points
such as markets or shops. As a result, take-up rates
for this universal programme in rural areas were
about 80 per cent (Case and Deaton 1998). By
contrast, as a money-saving measure, in Namibia, the
delivery of pensions was contracted out to a private
firm. However, such contracts are by their very
nature incomplete and as Hart et al. (1997) note, in
such circumstances private providers have strong
incentives to skimp on the quality of service
provision. In the Namibian case, this took the form
of minimising the number of locations at which the
elderly could receive their money. In more remote
northern areas, some pensioners had to travel as far
as 100 km to receive their pensions. This feature,
combined with difficulties in obtaining
documentation and registering beneficiaries, resulted
in, on average, 48 per cent of eligible individuals
receiving this ‘universal’ transfer, with this figure
falling as low as 30 or 34 per cent in some areas
(Subbarao 1998).
Because all governments face budget constraints, all
governments face difficult choices in deciding how
to allocate their resources among competing ends,
the identity of the beneficiaries and the means by
which these resources are to be transferred. A
decision to target social protection programmes
forces debates regarding these trade-offs into the
open. Targeting makes (or should make) explicit who
are the intended beneficiaries of a social protection
programme and the debates that lead up to the
criteria adopted for targeting require all parties
involved – governments, donors, civil society
representatives and prospective beneficiaries – to
make clear what their social protection goals are and
why targeting this particular group will help achieve
these goals. Explicit targeting also provides a
benchmark for assessing programme performance –
an obvious question for both monitoring and
evaluation is, ‘Are intended beneficiaries such as the
poor actually receiving benefits?’
3 The limits of targeting
The arguments described above make a case for
considering targeting social protection programmes.
They do not imply that all such programmes should
be targeted.
Decisions to target social protection interventions
should be based on assessments of both the benefits
and the costs of targeting. These costs take several
forms, some of which are less visible than others.
There are costs to individuals and households
associated with targeting. For example, cash-for-
work programmes involve households incurring an
opportunity cost in terms of forgone income
opportunities. Travelling to offices and lining up to be
interviewed (e.g. when benefits are means-tested)
has both financial and opportunity costs and there
may be further costs associated with obtaining
certifications required for the programme such as
identity cards or proof of residency. There are
administrative costs – the costs associated with
identifying beneficiaries such as those incurred when
implementing means testing of households or
conducting a survey on which to base a poverty map.
Even where targeting is delegated to non-
government actors, as in the case of community-
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based targeting, costs of identifying beneficiaries
persist even if they are less tangible, such as the
opportunity cost of the time spent by community
members in constructing lists of prospective
beneficiaries. Even less visible are the social tensions
generated when some individuals, but not others,
are selected for programme participation. These
costs may mean that less of the programme budget
is available to be distributed to beneficiaries.
However, while targeting costs may increase as the
targeting becomes finer, a targeted programme that
serves a smaller number of people may require
fewer staff to administer so that overall
administrative costs might be lower. Further, tighter
targeting – by reducing the number of beneficiaries
– may make it possible to increase transfers to those
individuals selected into the programme.
While the evidence suggests that targeting generally
increases the share of benefits going to poor people,
there are exceptions. Coady et al. (2004a,b) note that
in their sample, 14 per cent of the programmes
considered were regressive – that is, the poorest 20
per cent of households received less than 20 per
cent of programme benefits – a figure that rises to
25 per cent if self-targeted food subsidies are
included. Further, targeting does not mean that all
poor households will be included – there can be
errors of exclusion related to the inability of the
programme to correctly identify potential
beneficiaries. Poor targeting reflects bad design –
resources are transferred to individuals who were
not in fact poor – or bad implementation. Successful
targeting requires that programme administrators
know who the poor are and where, and how, they
can best be reached. It also requires the ability to
identify these individuals, households or groups.
Absent either of these and targeting will not be
effective.
Finally, targeting is only appropriate when it can be
done in a manner that respects the dignity of the
individuals who are to be assisted. While it is
sometimes suggested that stigma be used as a
means of targeting, this is wrong wrong wrong.
Targeting is only a means to an end – where the end
is the improvement in the wellbeing of beneficiaries.
Not only does stigmatising beneficiaries not
contribute to this objective, it can carry long-term
social and psychological costs that far outweigh the
benefits on offer.
4 Conclusion
When faced with the dilemma of ‘To be or not to
be’, Hamlet was famously indecisive, opting first ‘to
be’ before, courtesy of Laertes, becoming ‘not to be’
at the end of the play. Governments in developing
countries do not have the luxury of indecision when
it comes to choosing whether to target social
protection programmes. This essay argues that there
is a strong case for considering targeting. Targeting
has the potential to increase transfers to poor
households, a potential that is borne out by
experiences from all parts of the developing world.
But there are costs – some more visible than others
– as well as benefits to targeting, and these costs
must also be considered when the decision to target
or not to target a social protection programme is
being made.
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Notes
1 Subject to certain residency restrictions.
2 In 2000, the programme was modified and
renamed Oportunidades.
3 The line dYmin shows that, by definition, before
the transfer programme is in place households’
final incomes are equal to their original incomes.
4 See Chen et al. (2006) for a critique of this
approach and a suggested alternative.
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